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I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, societies attracted to unproductive ways of enhancing
or maintaining their usual levels of consumption have faced sub-
stantial resistance from their victims. Recently, however, we have
begun to appreciate the advantages of despoiling our neighbors in
time, rather than space. One of the most crucial advantages is the
limited political resistance that tends to arise from young or future
persons.
Once a society chooses, consciously or not, to take advantage of
future generations, the democratic process of electoral competition
tends to facilitate, rather than inhibit, such a choice. However, there
is no reason in principle why the Constitution's equal protection
clause cannot serve as a rallying point for resistance to the substan-
tial injustice between generations. Obviously, it is only with trepida-
tion that we should extend the coverage of the equal protection
clause to protect nonexistent generations. This Article suggests,
however, that sensitivity to both the benefits and the undoubted
risks and costs dictates at least some limited extension of equal pro-
tection to future generations.
This Article explores the nature of our society's inclination, mani-
fested increasingly throughout the past half century, to shift sub-
stantial costs and risks onto future generations. The Article draws
upon cultural history, the idea of partnership and the lessons of
partnership law, the history of deferral of gratification, the idea of a
social discount rate, and philosophical analyses of rights, including
the discussion of whether it makes sense to say that nonexistent
people have rights in the present. The argument focuses upon
generational cost-shifting in the law of marital dissolution, environ-
mental law, and most crucially, in the federal government's statutory
policy choices in areas such as social security funding, public savings
rates, and public indebtedness incurred to finance current general
consumption.
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The issue of an equal protection-based constitutional response to
intergenerational exploitation or breach of faith is not one that is
best explored with an eye toward mathematical rigor. The interests
of generations often overlap. Conflicts of interests between genera-
tions need not be stark, uniform, and clear-cut. The analytical focus
must occasionally shift from talk of different generations to talk of
short-term and long-term consequences. What counts as a genera-
tion may vary slightly for different purposes. There are doubtless
important differences between young children and generations not
yet conceived. Granting all these complications, a reasonably clear
societal problem remains. Ultimately, there is a crucial line of divi-
sion between those who, at the relevant time, are able to promote
their perceived interests effectively through the representative elec-
toral process, and those who for reasons of timing cannot.
Despite practical complications, including issues of justiciability,
the choice faced by current decisionmakers is increasingly plain.
The choice is between accepting inter-generational equal protection
litigation, or rationalizing a self-indulgent repudiation of a long-
held and morally justified cultural understanding of progressive in-
tergenerational sacrifice and responsibility. The idea of the equal
protection of generations does not license voluminous litigation on
behalf of unborn generations. Not every current decision adverse to
the interests of future generations amounts to a constitutional viola-
tion, just as not every coercive governmental regulation of business
rises to the level of a taking. As section III. B. illustrates, litigation
of the equal protection rights of future generations is, for practical
reasons, perhaps best confined to that focusing on overall effects,
overall resources, and overall opportunity levels available to future
generations, as measured, at least crudely, through federal budget-
ary and savings policy.
II. THE TRADITIONAL CULTURAL COMMITMENT TO POSTERITY
A. Partnership and the Future
Historically, American culture has embodied an element of obli-
gation to future generations. This has been a matter not merely of
aspiration, but of practice. The preamble to the Constitution itself
refers to the aim of securing "the blessings of liberty to ourselves
and our posterity . . . ." At the level of ordinary family life, parents
have sought a better life for their offspring than they enjoyed.2 In
1. U.S. CONST. preamble (emphasis added).
2. Narveson, Future People and Us, in OBLIGATIONS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS 57
(1978) [hereinafter OBLIGATIONS].
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part, this impulse to necessary sacrifice for the sake of succeeding
generations may reflect a sense of gratitude for sacrifices by our
predecessors for our benefit.3
The theme of morally binding linkages between generations, at
the societal level, was classically articulated by Edmund Burke.
Burke observed that
[s]ubordinate contracts for objects of mere occasional interest
may be dissolved at pleasure-but the state is to be looked on
with other reverence; because it is not a partnership in things
subservient only to the gross animal existence of a temporary
and perishable nature. It is a partnership in all science; a part-
nership in all art; a partnership in every virtue, and in all
perfection. As the ends of such a partnership cannot be ob-
tained in many generations, it becomes a partnership not only
between those who are living, but between those who are liv-
ing, those who are dead, and those who are to be born. Each
contract of each particular state is but a clause in the great
primeval contract of eternal society .... 4
Burke's formulation, which in turn reflects the understandings of his
ancestors,5 is today as often quoted for its presumed fallacies or ex-
cesses 6 as for its insights. Yet there are several themes running
through Burke's observations that remain worthy of attention.
First, and least explicit in this particular passage from Burke, is
the ultimately theocentric basis of Burke's conception of our bind-
ing obligation to future generations. The "great primeval contract
of eternal society"7 is meaningless apart from its divinely ordered
context. As Peter Laslett has observed, "religious revelation made
it possible for time to be held irrelevant and one man in one genera-
tion to stand in the place of another man in another genera-
tion. . . ."8 At least a substantial number of the framers of the
Constitution, so conceived the nature of the obligation to posterity.9
3. Derr, The Obligation to the Future, in RESPONSIBILITIES TO FUTURE GENERATIONS:
ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 40 (E. Partridge ed. 1981) [hereinafter RESPONSIBILITIES].
4. E. BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 110 (Dolphin ed. 1961).
5. See, e.g., E. TILLYARD, THE ELIZABETHAN WORLD PICTURE 25-36 (Vintage ed.).
6. See, e.g., Callahan, What Obligations Do We Have to Future Generations, in
RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 3, at 76-77 (no moral obligations follow, given our
involuntary entry into partnership); Laslett, The Conversation Between the Generations, in
PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND SOCIETY 40-41 (P. Laslett &J. Fishkin eds. 5th ed. 1979) (no
cogent justification of rights and duties follows therefrom); Golding, Obligations to Future
Generations, 56 Monist 85, 95-97 (1972) (expressing skepticism as to existence of
obligations to future generations).
7. E. BURKE, supra note 4, at 110.
8. Laslett, supra note 6, at 56.
9. See Hartshorne, The Ethics of Contributionism, in RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 3, at
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There is little doubt that religious motivations to promote the in-
terests of future persons historically have been important.'0 The
more interesting, and perhaps practically critical, question is
whether any other sorts of motivations can ultimately suffice. The
renowned ecological theorist Garrett Hardin has disconcertingly
wondered whether purely secular rationality is, over the long term,
up to the task of providing a stable, coherent, motivating justifica-
tion of an obligation to promote the interests of future genera-
tions. I The equally renowned economist Robert Heilbroner has
gone a step further by answering Hardin's question with a flat nega-
tive.12 The case for the view that any adequate foundation for a
genuinely binding moral obligation to, or on behalf of, posterity
must be theocentric may well be strong.' 3 We should in any event
consider the possibility that attenuation of religious belief in a soci-
ety may be correlated with a gradual attenuation of sacrificial con-
cern for the interests of posterity. 14
The traditional religious foundation for our cultural commitment
to future generations denies any particular generation a privileged
position, or a license to undermine and dissipate rather than en-
hance and transmit, the achievements of its predecessors. This no-
tion is reflected in the second of Burke's themes, that of the
perpetually unfinished but progressive character of the cultural en-
terprise. The obligation of each generation is to further, rather than
impair, the long-term process of cultural development. From this
there arises the duty to ensure not merely that future generations
can exist and survive, but that they are endowed with the cumulated
cultural inheritance necessary for them to advance the process of
cultural development.' 5
The sense of the moral importance of unrealized cultural poten-
tial continues to drive certain contemporary theories of intergenera-
tional obligation. Gregory Kavka, for example, reasons that
the accomplishments of mankind in the intellectual, artistic,
and scientific spheres, and the likelihood of continued pro-
10. Derr, supra note 3, at 41.
11. See Hardin, Who Caresfor Posterity? in RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 3, at 224.
12. See Heilbroner, What Has Posterity Ever Done for Me?, in RESPONSIBILITIES, supra
note 3, at 191.
13. See Passmore, Conservation, in RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 3, at 49; Thompson,
Are We Obligated to Future Others?, in id. at 202; Hartshorne, supra note 9, at 106. For a
discussion of some of the broader issues involved, see Wright, Legal Obligation and the
Natural Law, 23 GA. L. REV. 997 (1989).
14. Cf Laslett, supra note 6, at 56 (noting apparent inability of any essentially secular
substitute for religious commitment to generate satisfactory logic of moral obligation to
future generations, at least thusfar).
15. See Passmore, supra note 13, at 49-50 (discussing Kantian approach).
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gress in these fields, give us a substantial reason to wish the
race to survive. For if the life of our species ends, so will these
collective enterprises; while if it continues, spectacular accom-
plishments in such fields of endeavor are highly probable.' 6
It is important to appreciate, though, that the logic of progressive or
perfectionist approaches to intergenerational justice carries them
beyond the mere preservation of the species. Mere survival or stag-
nation is not the point. For spectacular accomplishments to be
highly probable, each generation must exercise some care, and
make some sacrifice, to ensure that the material, economic, and cul-
tural prerequisites of such spectacular progress are bequeathed to
each succeeding generation, in cumulative fashion. We shall ex-
plore more fully below in this section the implications of this view in
interpreting the constitutional requirements imposed by the equal
protection clause.
In the meantime, it is worth reflecting on the scope of what Pro-
fessor Brian Barry has referred to as "cosmic impertinence."' 7 As
Professor Barry recognizes, impertinence lies not merely in deliber-
ately or negligently bringing our collective life to a close, but in lim-
iting the constructive, developmental potential of that collective
life.18 Suppose, for example, that medieval European society had
stumbled upon some perhaps irreversible' 9 technique which, if ever
implemented, would ensure that the general level of cultural devel-
opment and well-being would never sink below the level already at-
tained by the medievals. Human society would persist indefinitely,
with no risk of material, economic, or cultural regression. The
price, though, would be the loss of the possibility of progress. The
guaranteed cultural floor also would be its ceiling.20
If there were a way for us to somehow speak from the future, to
advise the medieval contemplating whether to adopt the technique
16. Kavka, The Futurity Problem, in OBLIGATIONS, supra note 2, at 196. See also English,
Justice Between Generations, 31 PHIL. STUDIES 103-04 (1977) (commenting on John Rawls'
theory of intergenerational justice).
17. Barry, Justice Between Generations, in LAW, MORALITY, AND SocIETY 284 (P. Hacker
&J. Raz eds. 1977).
18. See id.
19. For purposes of our argument, we actually need not assume that the decision to
implement this technique would be irreversible, but the assumption adds starkness and
poignancy to the example. The cost of reversing a prior generation's choice for cultural
stagnation may go to the degree to which the later generation possesses a capacity for
cultural self-determination, though.
20. This precludes the possibilities of general progress and deterioration, as
measured by any means one cares to adopt, but does not preclude the idea of cultural
change. Equality does not imply sameness. Under our assumptions, a later generation
can gain in cultural value or achievement in some respect only to the extent that it
somehow loses cultural value or achievement in some offsetting respect.
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in question or not, there is little doubt of the substance of our ad-
vice. To bring cultural development to an end at such a stage would
be an unthinkable act of impertinence, of visionless narcissism. The
progressivist argument is that to do so would be wrong for the
medievals, and wrong, if not equally wrong, for us today.
Admittedly, rejecting the offer of guaranteed cultural stagnation
is in a sense not necessarily inconsistent with applying the Constitu-
tion's equal protection clause between generations. We can easily
distinguish between non-progressive and progressive applications
of the equal protection clause between generations. In a quite lit-
eral, if non-progressive sense, the medievals admittedly would be
ensuring equal protection of the laws to themselves and all future
generations by the choice of a floor and a ceiling to material, eco-
nomic, and cultural achievement, where the ceiling was no higher
than the floor. Persons who happen to be born in the seventeenth,
or nineteenth century in a sense have no complaint against the
medievals under the equal protection clause. They are, overall, just
as well off materially, economically, and culturally as any other gen-
eration, including their predecessors. To be just as well off is to be
equal.
Most of us resist this conclusion only because we have inherited a
more dynamic, progressive sense of the appropriate relationships
between generations. This sense translates into a progressive inter-
pretation of the equal protection clause's application between gen-
erations. A progressive interpretation of equal protection, of which
there may admittedly be varied formulations, would deny that the
medievals, in placing a ceiling and a floor on cultural development,
have really accorded equal protection of the laws to future genera-
tions. On this view, any generation that prevents, retards, or decel-
erates otherwise reasonably achievable overall cultural progress
denies equal protection of the laws to any significantly affected fu-
ture generation.
Equality, on this approach, consists not in handing on a static
level of achievement, but in sacrificing or investing,2' each genera-
21. These phrases obviously conceal a number of difficult policy choices. For
example, it must be determined, on a progressive interpretation of equal protection,
whether each generation is obligated for, say, equal per capita subjective absolute
sacrifice, or whether each generation is instead bound to add, in absolute or percentage
terms, the same increment to the growing cultural endowment. Each of these versions
of progressive equal protection may lead in practice to different results. Suppose, for
example, that one generation happened, without significant effort of their own, to
stumble through an unusual series of events upon cheap, practical cold fusion power.
Would their making that discovery available to posterity significantly reduce or partially
discharge their overall obligation of equal protection to the future?
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tion in turn, for the benefit of each succeeding generation, where
those generations are equally bound to augment the cultural stock
to be turned over to their successors. Each generation, on a pro-
gressive interpretation, benefits in turn from the cumulative sacri-
fices and investments of its predecessors, and is bound to sacrifice
and invest similarly on behalf of its successors. While each genera-
tion tends to be better off than its predecessor, this difference is
hardly invidious, and reflects the same set of principles of sacrifice,
savings, and investment, whatever they happen to be, applied fairly
to each generation in light of its material circumstances.
The progressive quality of the cultural enterprise, as envisioned
by Burke, is inseparable from the third, and most fully explicit
theme of Burke's remarks, that of the partnership nature of the in-
tergenerational enterprise.2 2 Society, on Burke's view, involves
partnership or fiduciary duties across time. Similar ideas are ex-
pressed by means of the language of stewardship, 23 trusteeship,24
and custodianship.2 5
While it would be foolish to deny that the concept of partnership
is applied between generations in a somewhat metaphorical sense,
the language and law of partnership is sufficiently relevant to be in-
structive. Consider the prosaic language of the Uniform Partner-
ship Act, which provides that
[e]very partner must account to the partnership for any bene-
fit, and hold as trustee for it any profits derived by him without
the consent of the other partners from any transaction con-
nected with the formation, conduct, or liquidation of the part-
nership or from any use by him of its property.2 6
Thankfully, the question of precisely which variant of progressive equal protection is
most desirable need not be resolved for purposes of this Article. A society that wishes to
accord equal protection to future generations will simply choose some reasonable
formula. We would presumably want a principle, or combination of principles, that
avoids overburdening early generations who may be close to the subsistence level, while
not licensing indolence or self-indulgence on the part of later generations. As well,
while a given output can presumably be produced or a given problem solved with less
exertion by later and wealthier generations than by earlier generations, this should not
license early generations promiscuously to shift the costs of their own activities into the
future in such a way as to unreasonably impair cultural progress. These themes are
elaborated in section V(c) below. For a general sense of the moral limits of calls to
collective sacrifice on behalf of the future, see P. BERGER, PYRAMIDS OF SACRIFICE 151
(1976); Narveson, supra note 2, at 59.
22. See supra text accompanying note 4.
23. See Toulmin, The Case for Cosmic Prudence, 56 TENN. L. REV. 29, 31 (1988).
24. See Golding, supra note 6, at 87.
25. See Barry, supra note 17, at 284.
26. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP Acr § 21(1), 6 U.L.A. 258 (1969).
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It is clearly established under the cases decided in accordance with
this provision that all partners owe one another fiduciary duties27 of
utmost good faith, fairness, and loyalty. 28 When one partner takes
on the role of "manager," as each generation in our context may be
said to do in turn, those obligations of fair dealing are only height-
ened. 29 Unless the partners have expressly agreed to the contrary, a
partner may not profit individually out of partnership business 30 or
in a way injurious to the interests of the partnership. 31 Opportuni-
ties which properly belong to the partnership may not generally be
used by individual partners for their own personal benefit.32
Of course, partnerships between generations are unique in that
absent some sort of special institutional mechanism of representa-
tion, future generations cannot expressly consent to any action un-
dertaken by a prior generation, though the future generation may
somehow ratify that prior action after the fact. But the uniqueness
of intergenerational partnerships does not show that they are not
usefully thought of as partnerships, or that the partnership law de-
veloped in more pedestrian contexts is inapplicable. The single
most salient lesson to be drawn from partnership law for our pur-
poses is the necessity of avoiding what amounts to generational self-
ishness and self-dealing. No generation is entitled to burden the
partnership, including its successor generations, for its own benefit
or advantage. If this seems onerous to each successive current gen-
eration-the "managing partner"-it is a fiduciary responsibility
borne equally, in turn, by each succeeding generation.
As we have seen above,33 our American constitutional predeces-
sor generations have taken the fiduciary burdens of intergenera-
tional partnership with some seriousness. As we have also seen, 34
religious belief may have been one of the crucial sustaining motiva-
tion in this regard. Limitation on consumption, enhancement of
savings, and the augmentation of productive capital are, as de-
27. See, e.g., Day v. Avery, 548 F.2d 1018, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
908 (1977); Sherman v. lUoyd, 181 Cal. App. 3d 693, 698, 226 Cal. Rptr. 495, 498
(1986).
28. See, e.g., Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 563 F.2d 1057, 1078 (2d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978).
29. See, e.g., Crenshaw v. Swenson, 611 S.W.2d 886, 890 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) ("It is
axiomatic that a managing partner in a general partnership owes his co-partners the
highest fiduciary duty recognized in the law.").
30. See, e.g., Phillips v. Kula 200, Wick Realty, Inc., 2 Hawaii App. 206, 211, 629 P.2d
119, 123 (1981).
31. See, e.g., Covalt v. High, 100 N.M. 700, 675 P.2d 999, 1001 (App. 1983).
32. See, e.g., Elle v. Babbitt, 259 Or. 590, 600, 488 P.2d 440, 445 (1971).
33. See supra notes 1-9 & accompanying text.
34. See supra note 10 & accompanying text.
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scribed by Max Weber, crucial to the Protestant Ethic.3 5 As well, a
society's willingness to sacrifice for its future may also reflect its
knowledge of,3 6 identification with,37 and concern for,3 8 its own
past. We might also reasonably speculate that a society's character-
istic overall time horizon, and the ability to defer gratification, col-
lectively and as reflected by individual decisionmakers, may, along
with other factors, affect the society's capacity to save, to invest pro-
ductively, to generate economic surpluses, and the sheer subjective
tolerability of sacrifice for the future.
There is at least some evidence to suggest that awareness of and
concern for the future,3 9 and the ability to defer gratification,40 are
among the factors positively associated with achievement and eco-
nomic development. The ability and inclination to focus on the
long term and to delay gratification may, as Benjamin Franklin, 4l
Max Weber,42 and contemporary psychologists 43 have supposed,
make sustained investment and the sustained progress of the eco-
nomic partnership possible.
The material and psychological demands of the progressive in-
tergenerational partnership are, all else equal, therefore best borne
by certain sorts of personalities. The subjective tolerability of the
demand that the future be taken into proper account may in part
depend upon such factors as family background. 44 As the following
section illustrates, however, there is some reason to suspect that our
35. See M. WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 53, 172
(1958).
36. See Hardin, supra note 11, at 228. If it could be shown that educated Americans
today know less of their history than did their predecessors of one or two generations
ago, this would suggest a possible reason for our current decreased devotion to the
interests of our successors.
37. See id. at 229.
38. See Bennett, On Maximizing Happiness, in OBLIGATIONS, supra note 2, at 67 ("I
would probably care less about the 21st century if I didn't love the 17th so much").
39. See, e.g., D. MCCLELLAND, THE ACHIEVING SOCIETY 237-39, 325 (1961); Triandis,
Toward a Psychological Theofy of Economic Growth,. 19 INT'L J. PSYCHOLOGY 79, 94 (1984).
40. See, e.g., Triandis, supra note 39, at 94; Ray & Najman, The Generalizability of
Deferment of Gratification, 126J. Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 117, 117 (1985). See also WrightJudicial
Responses to Long-Term Societal Decline, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 271, 277, 280 (1988) (discussing
the role of short-term orientation in societal decline).
41. See M. WEBER, supra note 35, at 51-53.
42. See id. at 172.
43. See supra notes 39-40; see also Funder, Block, & Block, Delay of Gratification: Some
Longitudinal Personality Correlates, 44 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 1198, 1199
(1983).
44. Cf. Funder, Block, & Block, supra note 43, at 1199 (delay of gratification and ego
control as "positively associated with childhood family environments emphasizing
structure, order, and conservative values and ... negatively associated with conflict in
the home").
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inclination as a society to honor the progressive intergenerational
partnership may vary over time and may be in the process of gener-
ally diminishing.
B. Future Generations and the Equal Protection Clause
The argument for a constitutionally enforceable commitment to
posterity is not solely dependent upon the premises that our societal
commitment to the future is diminishing, and that this trend should
somehow be stopped. Even if our societal commitment to the fu-
ture were not trending downward, there would still be a need for
constitutional protection for future generations.
This need is best illustrated by applying contemporary equal pro-
tection theory to the problem of the interests of future generations.
Doubtless more than one generation is enfranchised and voting at
any given time, and there is always a tendency of some strength for
the voters to incorporate the interests of their own descendants into
their own preferences. Voters tend to care, to some degree, about
their own or others' children and grandchildren.
But this still leaves the interests of future generations chronically
and systematically underrepresented in the electoral process when-
ever the interests of present and future diverge. It is all very well to"pressure legislators to take the interests of posterity into ac-
count,"' 45 but future generations themselves are literally silent polit-
ically.46 They also have little if any current bargaining power, and
little with which to reward or threaten the current generation of leg-
islators.47 Any current generation of legislators must, for the sake
of maximizing the probability of electoral survival, itself be oriented
toward relatively short-term benefits for constituents. 48
John Hart Ely's approach 49 to the equal protection clause pro-
vides at least a partial remedy for the inevitable tendency of
electorally responsive legislators to skew their legislation in favor of
short-term results, and in favor of the currently enfranchised. On
45. Kavka, supra note 16, at 189.
46. See Epstein, Justice Across Generations, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1465, 1465 (1989).
47. See J. GLOVER, WHAT SORT OF PEOPLE SHOULD THERE BE? 145 (1984); Barry,
supra note 17, at 271. Posterity will eventually exercise some control over a current
legislator's reputation or place in history, but this factor may not tip the balance even on
close votes.
48. See Epstein, supra note 46, at 1467, 1481. Professor Epstein favors limited
government, rather than an equal protection-based approach, as a response to this
problem. For a broader constitutional approach, see generally G. BRENNAN & J.
BUCHANAN, THE REASON OF RULES (1986); J. BUCHANAN, LIBERTY, MARKET AND STATE
(1986).
49. See generally J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
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Ely's representation-reinforcing approach, the equal protection
clause 50 may be interpreted so as to neutralize systematic legislative
underrepresentation 5' of relatively powerless, 52 non-participating 53
groups. Of course, it would be going too far to think of future gen-
erations as the stigmatized victims of some ideology according to
which they are inferior.54 But the fact that future generations are
not stigmatized as inferior does not mean that their interests are
effectively represented legislatively. If, as Ely observes, "nonresi-
dents are a paradigmatically powerless class politically,"5 5 then so
are future generations. Future generations might well be thought of
as a subcategory of nonresidents, in that they are, for practical elec-
toral purposes, not-yet-residents.
The point of granting constitutional equal protection to future
generations is primarily to attempt to neutralize the systematic, in-
evitable legislative bias in favor of those who can organize, contrib-
ute to campaigns, and vote. Judges, particular-ly tenured Article III
judges, charged with enforcing the equal protection of the laws face
different reward and incentive structures than do legislators. Judges
may personally feel no more solicitous than legislators of the inter-
ests of posterity, but they need not fear retaliation for taking the
interests of future generations fairly into account.
It is worth recalling that the framers of the Constitution implicitly
recognized posterity as what might be thought of as a distinct cate-
gory.56 Admittedly, the case law of posterity under the equal pro-
tection clause is minimal at best.57 In part, this dearth of case law
reflects legitimate questions of standing, ripeness, and justiciability,
50. The essential logic of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause is
binding on the federal government via the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
51. SeeJ. ELY, supra note 49, at 82.
52. See id. at 83.
53. See id. at 87.
54. For the classic such case, see Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). It
should be noted, though, that our argument does not require that any legislative
classifications adverse to the interests of future generations receive rigorous "strict
scrutiny" from the courts. Compare City of Richmond v.J. A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706,
721 (1989) (strict scrutiny imposed in remedial racial discrimination case) with Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211-12 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that equal
protection clause "does not direct the courts to apply one standard of review in some
cases and a different standard in other cases"). In our context, there is no need for a
special, distinctive level of judicial scrutiny beyond determining that federal budgetary
and savings policy can reasonably be accounted for on some basis other than the
inclination to disproportionately shift substantial costs to future generations.
55. J. ELY, supra note 49, at 83.
56. See U.S. CONST. preamble.
57. The district court opinion in Bolden v. City of Mobile quotes the preamble's
reference to posterity in the context of an assertion of the right to equal treatment under
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which will be addressed in the concluding section below. But the
absence of relevant case law also reflects the fact that the problem of
unjust legislative treatment of future generations has only quite re-
cently become severe. This in turn is due in part to technological
change58 -early legislators could not have left the problems of radi-
oactive waste with long half-lives, the depletion of the ozone layer,
or global warming to be solved by future generations, even if they
had been so inclined. The increased importance of the claims of the
future reflect unattractive cultural trends as well, several of which
are considered in the following section.
III. THE CONTEMPORARY DISINCLINATION TO SACRIFICE: SOME
MANIFESTATIONS AND LIMITS
As a society, Americans have, it seems, typically been willing to
respond favorably to an appeal for reasonable sacrifice for the sake
of the future.59 Peter Laslett has suggested that "it would be very
difficult to find an example from the past where one 'generation' did
spend their savings in a way which caused suffering to their succes-
sors .... "60 Finding a current such example has recently become
less difficult. Professor Benjamin Friedman has spoken for many in
arguing that
[t]he trouble with an economic policy that artificially boosts
consumption at the expense of investment, dissipates assets,
and runs up debt is simply that each of these outcomes vio-
lates the essential trust that has always linked each generation
to those that follow. We have enjoyed what appears to be a
higher and more stable standard of living by selling our and
our children's economic birthright. 61
Professor Friedman's concerns focus, on one manifestation of an
underlying spirit of the age. It has perhaps always been true that to
some degree our limited imaginations, limited empathy, and limited
identification with the future has biased our decisionmaking against
the equal protection clause, but the linkage is not made explicit. 423 F. Supp. 384, 402-
03 (S.D. Ala. 1976), af'd, 571 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
58. See Baier, For the Sake of Future Generations, in EARTHBOUND 214, 214 (1984).
59. See Laslett, supra note 6, at 45.
60. Id. at 54.
61. B. FRIEDMAN, DAY OF RECKONING 5 (1988). It may be argued that our economic
policies have not truly destroyed anyone's birthright, but merely transferred much of
that birthright to other nations, thus preserving the value of that birthright for at least
humanity in general. This, however, would still be rightly objectionable to those whose
birthright has been sold without accounting for the proceeds, as it is they, as persons
within the United States and not humanity in general, who are the intended primary
beneficiaries of the equal protection clause.
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posterity and toward the present.62 We should not exaggerate or
romanticize the commitment of past generations to the future. Past
generations may, for example, have simply lacked the technical ca-
pacity to generate massive amounts of toxic wastes posing multi-
generational risks. Just as important, however, is the contemporary
sense that the degree of empathy for, identification with, and con-
cern for future generations is historically variable, and in fact is di-
minishing in our time.
Along these lines, Christopher Lasch has argued that "we are fast
losing the sense of historical continuity, the sense of belonging to a
succession of generations originating in the past and stretching into
the future." 63 Correspondingly, according to Professor Lasch, there
is occurring an "erosion of any strong concern for posterity." 64
This erosion of self-restraint with respect to future generations is
obviously of great importance. 65 The focus of this Article, however,
is not on constitutionally restraining anything as ethereal as the"spirit of the age," or on declaring a cultural trend or ambience to
violate the equal protection clause. As the economist James
Buchanan has emphasized, this erosion of moral constraint has
manifested itself concretely in the functioning of our political insti-
tutions.r6 Mortgaging the future, as well as other forms of major
resource transfers from the future for the sake of general present
consumption, are not merely vague cultural trends, but "legislated
public policy." 67 It is hardly unprecedented to apply constitutional
equal protection tests to cultural trends formally embodied in
legislation.
A. Divorce and Child Support Law As Intergenerational Redistribution
Recent changes in the law and practice of divorce in cases in
which the spouses have minor children provide an illustration of the
general cultural trends briefly alluded to above. This is not to deny
that parents have ceased to incorporate the welfare of their children
into their own decisions about how much and when to consume, 68
or even that parents have ceased to realize that their children will in
62. SeeJ. GLOVER, supra note 47, at 147.
63. C. LAsCH, THE CULTURE OF NARCISSISM 30 (1979).
64. id.
65. SeeJ. BUCHANAN, supra note 48, at 189; Wilson, The Rediscovery of Character: Private
Virtue and Public Policy, 81 PUB. Ir. 3, 16 (1985).
66. See J. BUCHANAN, supra note 48, at 189. See also Wilson, supra note 65, at 10-11
(quoting Professor Buchanan).
67. B. FRIEDMAN, supra note 61, at 5.
68. See Epstein, supra note 46, at 1472.
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turn care about their own children. 69 But there is no obvious reason
why the degree to which parents are inclined to sacrifice in order to
safeguard the legitimate interests of their children must remain his-
torically constant.70
There is in fact a growing body of evidence suggesting that, at
least over the last century or so, "the family bond has become pro-
gressively tenuous." 7' While the net effect of such changes has, as
we shall see immediately below, been in many cases to the substan-
tial detriment of the children directly affected, the adverse impact
on children has not markedly slowed the legal system's accommoda-
tion of changes in family patterns. As has been observed in this con-
text, "within some limits, adult needs and the pressures of economic
forces, not children's needs, determine family patterns in this world.
As changes occur, what is good for children is conveniently
redefined." 72
Mary Ann Glendon has recently summarized certain changes in
the law and practice of divorce as involving a movement from no-
fault to no-responsibility divorce. 7" Professor Glendon suggests
that
[t]he American story about marriage, as told in the law and
much popular literature, goes something like this: marriage is
a relationship that exists primarily for the fulfillment of the in-
dividual spouses. If it ceases to perform this function, no one
is to blame and either spouse may terminate it at will ....
Children hardly appear in the story; at most they are rather
shadowy characters in the background.7 4
As background figures, the children of divorce are often called upon
to suffer not so much along with the parents, but in ways that reflect
a redistribution of income, well-being, and security in favor of at
least one parent. It is hardly clear that the legal system operates in
such a way as to require the parents to take full and appropriate
account of any substantial, enduring costs that may in many cases be
imposed by divorce on the minor children. Instead, the costs of di-
69. See Hubin,Justice and Future Generations, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 70, 78 (1976).
70. See Chambers, The Coming Curtailment of Compulsory Child Support, 80 MICH. L. REv.
1614, 1625 (1982) ("Over the coming decades, it is possible that most divorced,
noncustodial parents will become even more detached from their children by a previous
relationship than they are today").
71. Golding, supra note 6, at 95 n.8.
72. Chambers, supra note 70, at 1626.
73. M. GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 104-05 (1987).
74. Id. at 108.
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vorce are often largely "externalized" to the children, although
some of these costs are ultimately borne by society at large as well. 75
One aspect of the intergenerational redistribution often involved
focuses on child support. Whether child support is actually paid as
agreed or adjudicated or not, the amounts set "are too low, as a rule
less than what noncustodial parents can afford, and typically less
than half of what it costs to raise a child at a minimally decent
level." 76 The equally significant redistribution of long-term77 psy-
chological well-being following upon divorce is also, at least in some
respects, typically unfavorable to the children, a fact not lost on the
children themselves. 78 These effects are not utterly uncontrollable
judicially.
This is of course not to suggest in the slightest that divorce is
typically casually undertaken, or that divorce does not commonly
involve adult, and typically female, victims. For our purposes,
though, it is important to bear in mind not only the adult female
victims of divorce, but that divorce "is almost always more devastat-
ing for children than for their parents. ' 79 In a study undertaken by
Judith Wallerstein, "almost half of the children [of divorced par-
ents] entered adulthood as worried, underachieving, self-deprecat-
ing . . .young men and women." 80 Diminished parenting after
divorce often becomes permanent. 8' Some children of divorce are
forced to literally raise themselves, 82 perhaps in addition to caring
for a troubled parent.8 3 Nor does the evidence suggest that the se-
verity of the redistributive consequences of divorce on the children
in frequent cases has lessened with the increasing prevalence and
societal acceptance of divorce.84 If anything, the opposite may be
the case.85
Wallerstein reasonably expresses skepticism that all conceivable
marital and divorce laws and practices extend the same degree of
protection to the children. 86 Echoing Professor Glendon,8 7 Waller-
75. SeeJ. WALLERSTEIN & S. BLAKESLEE, SECOND CHANCES xxi, 307 (1989).
76. M. GLENDON, supra note 73, at 87.
77. See J. WALLERSTEIN & S. BLAKESLEE, supra note 75, at xii.
78. See id. at xvii.
79. Id. at 297.
80. Id. at 299. See also L. WErrzMAN, THE DIVORCE REvOLurnON 321-22 (1985)
(children of divorce as often "pervasively unhappy, distrustful, and pessimistic" as
result).
81. See J. WALLERSTEIN & S. BLAKESLEE, supra note 75, at 301-02.
82. See id. at 299.
83. See id. at 299, 303.
84. See id. at 303.
85. See id.
86. See id. at 305; Chambers, supra note 70, at 1626.
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stein concludes that "the voices of our children are not represented
in the political arena. Although men and women talk about children,
it is hard for me to believe that they are necessarily talking for chil-
dren."8 18 This is close to the essence of the problem that the equal
protection clause can assist in solving. 89 While statutory reform is
doubtless essential, it can no longer be ignored that minor children
of divorcing parents do not vote or otherwise directly influence the
electoral process themselves in traditional ways. Young children do
have an important political advantage over persons not yet born, in
that they are visible and concrete, as opposed to mere abstractions.
Despite the best efforts of advocacy groups on their behalf, we
should, however, expect statutorily enacted law to tend systemati-
cally to unduly discount the interests of the children of divorce.
That the children affected are merely too young to significantly af-
fect the political process does not distinguish them in principle from
those who cannot significantly affect the political process because
they do not yet exist.
B. Reduced Savings Rates and Unproductive Deficits As
Intergenerational Transfers
Increasingly, there is a sense that whatever prosperity our society
enjoys is not so much a matter of fate, but a reflection in some mea-
sure of the degree of solicitude for the interests of later generations
shown by earlier generations. As a number of observers have noted,
recently we have apparently made tacitly the collective decision to
benefit economically, in a number of respects, at the expense of fu-
ture generations.
The chronic federal budget deficit, to the extent that such a deficit
expands general current consumption as opposed to productive in-
vestment, 90 poses an issue of intergenerational morality. As Ru-
dolph Penner has observed, "the issue of deficit reduction is really
an issue of the relative wellbeing of different generations as mea-
sured by their consumption. The question involves a moral value
87. See M. GLENDON, supra note 73, at 108.
88. J. WALLERSTEIN & S. BLAKESLEE, supra note 75, at 305 (emphasis in the original).
The minimal political influence of young children may also help to account for the
chronic, severe deprivation of educational opportunities inflicted on a substantial
number of public school children. See generally Wright, The Place of Public School Education
in the Constitutional Scheme, 13 S. ILL. U.L.J. 53 (1988).
89. For a discussion of the effects of the equal protection clause on future
generations see supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
90. See Modigliani, Life Cyce, Individual Thrift, and the Wealth of Nations, 76 AM. ECON.
REv. 297, 311 (1986).
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judgment. How well do we want to treat our children and
grandchildren?" 9 1
The current generation, having available to it the deinhibiting ef-
fects of various forms of Keynsianism, has, as Professors
Buchanan 92 and Wilson 93 have noted, succumbed to a temptation
that has in some sense always been present for all modern genera-
tions: to change the terms of the intergenerational partnership in
their favor. Professor Buchanan has noted a primary consequence
of such change: "the issue of debt for the purpose of financing cur-
rent-period use or consumption is equivalent to the destruction of
the capital value of the asset stream that is anticipated." 94 Public
debt in such circumstances has the effect of an intergenerational re-
distribution. 95 Nor has our public debt been incurred exclusively to
remedy other equal protection or other constitutional violations by
the government.
It is important for our purposes to recognize that however abhor-
rent large-scale intergenerational redistribution against future gen-
erations may be from the standpoint of the Burkean progressive
partnership, there is no reason to suppose that ordinary, nonconsti-
tutional political mechanisms will eventually suppress such a phe-
nomenon. The benefits of deficit reduction are long-term96 and
accrue in substantial measure to non-voters. 97 Any progress in defi-
cit reduction contributed to by voters at one time may be utterly
undone in the following time period. 9a Politicians sufficiently heroic
to promise redress in favor of those who are not yet voters will tend
to be outbid in electoral competition.99 If the moral.problem is to
be reliably solved, then, it must be solved by constitutional mecha-
nisms that bypass traditional electoral competition.100 The focus of
constitutional constraint, again, need not be on diffuse private be-
havior, but on statutorily enacted public policy.' 0 '
91. Penner, The Economics and the Morality of the Budget Deficit, 23 Bus. ECON. 6, 8
(1988).
92. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
93. Id.
94. J. BucHANAN, supra note 48, at 197.
95. Persson, Deficits and Intergenerational Welfare in Open Economics, 19J. INT'L ECON. 67,
83 (1985).
96. White & Wildavsky, How to Fix the Deficit-Really, 94 PUB. INT. 3, 13 (1989).
97. SeeJ. BUCHANAN, supra note 48, at 205.
98. See G. BRENNAN & J. BUCHANAN, supra note 48, at 94.
99. See Crain & Ekelund, Deficits and Democracy, 44 S. EcON. J. 813, 827 (1978).
100. See G. BRENNAN &J. BUCHANAN, supra note 48, at 81, 93.
101. See B. FRIEDMAN, supra note 61, at 5.
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A similar analysis can be made of our society's declining 0 2 and
relatively low' 0 3 national savings rate. While this overall decline re-
flects diminution in personal and business saving as well as govern-
ment saving,' °4 the sharpest decline over the past decade has been
in government saving,' 0 5 the component most directly amenable to
constitutional control. The intergenerational consequences of this
savings pattern are reasonably clear. Reduced national savings
reduces investment for the future.'0 6 To some limited degree, this
might be compensated for by such mechanisms as foreign borrow-
ing for investment purposes. The bulk of our foreign borrowing,
however, has gone to maintain or enhance current consumption
rather than investment.' 0 7 Reduced investment inevitably reduces
the growth of future living standards.' 08 The present does better at
the expense of the future.' 0 9
The same redistributive consequences are manifested in the fund-
ing mechanisms of government programs. The early generations of
the Social Security retirement system received far more in benefits
than they contributed."10  More importantly, "middle-income
household heads in the cohort to be born in 1990 are projected over
their lifetimes to lose, on net, roughly $60,000 in present value as a
consequence of participating in Social Security.""' The benefi-
ciaries of such transfers are, not surprisingly, among those currently
voting. Social Security expenditures over the past twenty years or
so have admirably reduced poverty among the aged, along with gen-
erally enhancing the economic well-being of the retired." 1 2 This is
102. Bosworth, There's No Simple Explanation for the Collapse in Saving, CHALLENGE, July-
Aug. 1989, at 27, 27; Summers & Carroll, Why Is U.S. National Saving So Low?, 1987
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. AcTIvrrY 607, 607.
103. Summers & Carroll, supra note 102, at 607.
104. Nordhaus, What's Wrong with a Declining National Saving Rate?, CHALLENGE, July-
Aug. 1989, 22, 22.
105. Id. at 22-23. See also Summers & Carroll, supra note 102, at 635 (changes in
government's fiscal posture as most potent way to increase national saving).
106. Nordhaus, supra note 104, at 23.
107. Bosworth, supra note 102, at 27. See also Hooper, U.S. Net Foreign Saving Has Also
Plunged, CHALLENGE, July-Aug. 1989, at 33 (discussing recent shift in American position
to one of substantial net foreign indebtedness).
108. Gramlich, Budget Deficits and National Saving. Are Politicians Exogenous?, 3 J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 23, 33 (1989); Nordhaus, supra note 104, at 23.
109. See Nordhaus, supra note 104, at 23.
110. Kotlikoff, Deficit Delusion, 84 PuB. INT. 53, 62 (1986).
111. Id. For a discussion of the inability of Social Security trust fund surpluses to
reduce chronic federal budget deficits substantially, see Penner, supra note 91, at 9.
112. Summers & Carroll, supra note 102, at 626; Coder, Rainwater & Smeeding,
Inequality Among Children and Elderly in Ten Modern Nations: The United States in an
International Context, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 320, 323 (1989).
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in itself of course praiseworthy. No comparable improvement has
been achieved in the realm of child poverty. 113
It has been argued that reduced government savings is not as sig-
nificant as might be imagined, in that there will be a countervailing
tendency for rational citizens to detect and offset reduced govern-
ment savings by increasing their own private savings.' 14 This view,
implied by the Ricardian equivalence theorem, has attracted a cer-
tain degree of support, 115 and if robustly true would mitigate the
intergenerational effects of reduced government savings. The ma-
jority view, 16 however, seems to be that Ricardian equivalence de-
pends crucially on narrow and unrealistic assumptions 1 7 and that it
has not been persuasively borne out by the evidence of recent eco-
nomic history."18
It is also possible to argue that increased current consumption, at
least during periods of substantial unemployment, may involve no
significant adverse generational effects, in that such increased con-
sumption, supplied by underutilized resources, leads to greater, not
less investment, and involves no significant borrowing from future
generations. 1 9 Again, if this actually captured the essence of the
fiscal history of the last decade, the intergenerational impact of fed-
eral budget policy would be mitigated. Unfortunately, the evidence
appears to suggest that the federal budget deficits of the 1980s have
not had the effect of raising national saving, via a stimulative effect,
along with current consumption. °20 The singularly nontechnical
language of Benjamin Friedman has it that "America has thrown it-
self a party and billed the tab to the future."' 121 Whether the term"party" is entirely apt is doubtful, given the vague but pervasive
sense of a society anxiously seeking by the least immediately uncom-
fortable means to merely maintain and preserve, if temporarily, its
accustomed growth in consumption. The effect on future genera-
tions is, however, the same.
113. See Coder, Rainwater & Smeeding, supra note 112, at 323.
114. See Barro, The Ricardian Approach to Budget Deficits, 3J. ECON. PERSP. 37, 45 (1989);
Barro, Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?, 82J. POL. ECON. 1095 (1974).
115. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 46, at 1478.
116. See Penner, supra note 91, at 11 n.3.
117. See Lindbeck & Weibull, Intergenerational Aspects of Public Transfers, Borrowing and
Debt, 88 SCAND. J. ECON. 239, 241-42 (1986); Modigliani, supra note 90, at 310-11.
118. See Bemheim, A Neoclassical Perspective on Budget Deficits, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 55, 67
(1989); Eisner, Budget Deficits: Rhetoric and Reality, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 73, 73 (1989);
Gramlich, supra note 108, at 28-29; Summers & Carroll, supra note 102, at 610-17.
119. See Eisner, supra note 118, at 74.
120. Gramlich, supra note 108, at 33-34.
121. B. FRIEDMAN, supra note 61, at 4.
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C. Long-Term Environmental Protection As a Test Case
The protection of future generations against environmental disas-
ter poses a number of intriguing philosophical issues. These issues
will be discussed in the section immediately below. In the
meantime, it is worth considering an encouraging, if unfulfilled, fed-
eral statutory recognition of the interests of future generations in
the area of environmental policy.
The National Environmental Policy Act explicitly recognizes the
environmental requirements of future generations. 22 The Burkean
notion of generational trusteeship of the environment is invoked.123
The Environmental Impact Statement required of federal agencies
contemplating action significantly affecting the environment is stat-
utorily directed to include reference to certain tradeoffs between
short-term use of the environment and long-term productivity. 124
Despite such language, there remain legitimate grounds for con-
cern that the environmental interests of future generations are not
adequately safeguarded by the National Environmental Policy Act.
The Act itself does not mandate that actual substantive results or
decisions reflect environmental values.' 2 5 The requirement is in-
stead merely that potential environmental consequences be consid-
ered, procedurally, in the decisionmaking process. 2 6 As well, it is
disturbing that under the case law, the remoteness in time of some
potential adverse environmental impact is often coupled with the
highly speculative or conjectural quality of the impact as a reason
for not requiring that the particular impact in question be discussed
in the Environmental Impact Statement.' 2 7 The Supreme Court, fi-
nally, has declined to require that the agency prepare a "worst case
analysis" in the face of environmental impacts of uncertain severity
or probability. 28 While this is perhaps reasonable on its own
122. See 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a)(1982).
123. See id. § 4331(b)(1).
124. See id. § 4332(C)(iv); NRDC v. Administrator, 451 F. Supp. 1245, 1264 (D.D.C.
1978).
125. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 109 S. Ct. 1835, 1846 (1989)
(citing Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28
(1980) (per curiam)); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519,
558 (1978)).
126. See Robertson, 109 S. Ct. at 1846. Other, perhaps more limited, federal statutes
may impose substantive, if not particularly future-oriented, environmental restrictions.
See id. at 1846, 1846 n.14.
127. See, e.g., Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 621 F.2d 1017, 1026 (9th Cir.
1980); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hoffman, 566 F.2d 1060, 1067 (8th Cir.
1977); Sierra Club v. Hodel, 544 F.2d 1036, 1039 (9th Cir. 1976).
128. See Robertson, 109 S. Ct. at 1847-48.
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terms, 129 it may imply a practical bias against the future, to the ex-
tent that "worst case" outcomes may be disproportionately likely to
cumulate in the relatively long-term, as opposed to short-term,
future.
It is doubtless premature to attempt to determine whether the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act, by itself or in conjunction with
other substantive environmental statutes, 3 0 has worked to signifi-
cantly constrain the shifting of environmental costs and risks onto
politically unenfranchised future generations. A skeptical observer
has concluded that "the behavioral intention of the present genera-
tion of Jefferson's descendants is to enjoy as many blessings of lib-
erty as they can while leaving to posterity . . . a used up garbage
dump." If so, then environmental law, no less than federal
budget policy, will reflect what may well amount to a partial repudi-
ation of the Burkean generational partnership.
IV. RIGHTS AND FUTURE GENERATIONS
A. The Moral Status of Future Persons
Future persons, whatever advantages they may come to possess,
face the disadvantage, from our standpoint, of being abstract, dis-
embodied, impersonal, and contingent. One writer has been suffi-
ciently forthright to proclaim that "the hordes of future 'neighbors'
will have to put up with my indifference. Future beings, being
nonbeings, can have no demands to make upon me. Even if they
did, they have no reality, save potential reality, sufficient to establish
an emotional bond of identification with me."132
The inclination among the philosophically minded to deny that
we owe moral obligations to future generations, or that the latter
have rights or just claims meriting current respect, is actually quite
strong.'33 This skepticism reflects not merely the abstractness of
future generations, but other considerations as well. How, it is
129. Worst-case effects may be of obvious, undeniable severity. See Gribble, 621 F.2d
at 1026.
130. See supra note 126 and the statutes referred to therein. See also Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (1983) (defining "hazardous
waste" partially in terms of potential; as opposed to present, risks).
131. Thompson, supra note 13, at 199.
132. Id. at 201.
133. See, e.g., Ball, The Incoherence of IntergenerationalJustice, 28 INQUIRY 321, 323 (1985);
Golding, supra note 6, at 89; Hubin, supra note 69, at 70-71, 79; Laslett, supra note 6, at
46; Macklin, Can Future Generations Correctly Be Said to Have Rights?, in RESPONSIBILrrIES,
supra note 3, at 152.
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asked, can persons not yet born have rights against us now?' 3 4 A
present right presumably implies a present rightholder. Justice is
non-arbitrarily a matter of relations between contemporaries, 3 5 be-
cause justice depends upon the possibility of reciprocal conferral of
substantial benefits' 3 6 and reciprocal vulnerability between mem-
bers of the moral community.' 3 7 The very possibility of communi-
cation between the generations is necessarily one-way.
As well, it is predictable that both the meaning ofjustice and what
counts as an interest, or an injury to interests, will change over the
course of the generations.13 8 Nor is the direction of such changes
itself predictable.' 9 Thus a further indeterminacy is lent to the idea
of justice between generations. Ultimately, it is thought, the idea of
intergenerational justice, at least between distant generations, may
be incoherent.' 40 On such a theory, obligations owed directly to
future generations reduce to mere generosity, or mercy,' 41 or to an
utterly unprincipled mere preference. 42
One way of limiting the adverse intergenerational impact of these
implications is through arguing that either our own psychic well-
being' 43 or the interests of our own living children and grandchil-
dren and other younger contemporaries 144 require actions at least
indirectly promoting the likely interests of future generations. We
may owe present duties concerning or in respect of,145 if not directly
to, future generations because of our obligations to respect the
rights-claims of presently existing persons. 146
Sole reliance on this escape hatch, however, to a degree falsifies
our moral sentiments. The obligations of the Burkean partnership
have traditionally not been confined to only the most directly re-
lated links in the generational chain. Matters such as contempora-
134. See, e.g., Golding, supra note 6, at 89. See generally DeGeorge, The Environment,
Rights, and Future Generations, in ETmICS AND PROBLEMS OF THE 21ST CENTURY 93 (1979).
135. See Hubin, supra note 69, at 79.
136. See id. at 71.
137. See id. at 79.
138. See Ball, supra note 133, at 322.
139. See id.
140. See id. at 323.
141. See id. at 328.
142. See Bennett, supra note 2, at 66.
143. See Partridge, Why Care About the Future?, in RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 3, at 209.
144. See Dipert, Reflections on the Rights of Future Generations, in RIGHTS AND REGULATION:
ETHICAL, POLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC ISSUES 210 (1983); Hubin, supra note 69, at 80;
Schwartz, Obligations to Posterity, in OBLIGATIONS, supra note 2, at 12-13.
145. See Delattre, Rights, Responsibilities, and Future Persons, 82 ETHICS 254, 256 (1972);
Dipert, supra note 144, at 206; Hubin, supra note 69, at 80.
146. See, e.g., Delattre, supra note 145, at 256; Dipert, supra note 144, at 206; Hubin,
supra note 69, at 80.
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neity, reciprocity of benefit, and reciprocity of vulnerability may
help explain how just institutions might actually or hypothetically
arise as a result of disinterested bargaining. But we can hardly rule
out in principle the idea of a valid moral norm committing us to
respect the interests of those who literally cannot bargain with us, or
who have little to offer or bargain with, or who cannot substantially
threaten our own interests in turn. 147 These considerations obvi-
ously bear upon matters such as whether it is in our self-interest to
treat future generations on the basis of equality, but equality among
the generations may be antecedently morally binding, whether it is
in our narrow self-interest to agree to this or not.
We might, for example, on some theories be said to owe some-
thing to future generations by virtue of our partially voluntary ac-
ceptance of benefits conferred on us by the sacrificial efforts of past
generations who can be properly repaid in no other way.' 48 There
seems an element of arrogance and of grotesque impropriety in re-
pudiating our Burkean obligations to the future, whether this would
be self-interestedly rational for us or not.149 If distance in space
does not in principle bar any moral obligations from arising,
neither, on such a view, does distance in time.
This point is often illustrated by shifting the future obligation
problem backward in time, so that we as the current generation be-
come the beneficiary of an intergenerational obligation. Consider,
for example, an unusually creative, if malicious, 18th century Phila-
delphia inventor who deposits a large quantity of poison gas in a
container he knows will rupture in precisely 200 years. Let us sup-
pose further, for the sake ofjusticiability, that he has, as a cryogen-
ics pioneer, also left himself a wake-up call for six months after the
escape of the poison gas. What can be said, in terms of moral and
legal rights and obligations, when the gas escapes, resulting in mul-
tiple deaths and injuries, and the inventor thaws out? 50
It would hardly appear to involve some fallacy of moral reasoning
to condemn the inventor's actions as in breach of a moral obliga-
tion, or even to find him criminally liable. Yet consider what the
inventor could say in his defense. His victims did not exist at the
147. But cf. Hubin, supra note 69, at 79-80 (discussing requisites of mutual
vulnerability and possibilities for cooperation). Again, this picture is clouded a bit by
the eventual power of future generations over our continuing reputations.
148. See Callahan, supra note 6, at 77.
149. See Hartshorne, supra note 9, at 107.
150. This hypothetical derives from those posed in, among others, R. Sartorius,
Governmental Regulation and IntergenerationalJustice, in RIGHTS AND REGULATION: ETHICAL,
POLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC ISSUES 197 (1983) and M.A. Warren, Future Generations, in AND
JUSTICE FOR ALL 148 (1982).
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time of the act for which he is condemned. It was uncertain whether
there would be any people at all in existence at the time the
container ruptured.' 5 ' Such persons might, for all the eighteenth
century inventor knew, possess some sort of immunity or protection
from the poison gas. Perhaps they would regard what was formerly
a poison gas as a valuable resource. Certainly an eighteenth century
inventor could imagine that in two hundred years' time, ethical
codes would have changed extensively, in unpredictable ways.' 52
All of this would be true, but none of it would be of great moral
significance.
Admittedly, there remains something logically awkward about
ascribing rights, at least in the present, to not-yet-existing genera-
tions.' 5 3 The problem is not merely the long delay between the cul-
pable act and the first indication of harm; it is more a matter of a
supposed present right without a present rightholder. This sort of
awkwardness has led to attempts to circumvent the problem by
grounding the moral wrongness in purely utilitarian concerns, with
no reference to rights.' 54 Such attempts may not be fully satisfac-
tory, though. What if it could be shown, all else equal, that we, in
our exquisitely sensitive narcissism, have gained slightly greater util-
ity from the past decade of economic self-indulgence than will be
lost by the perhaps more stoic, responsible future generations by
virtue of their picking up the tab? Our conduct would still remain a
moral embarrassment.
The concept of equal protection of the laws speaks at least as
much to state obligations and responsibilities as it does to individual
recipient rights. The equal protection, by law, of future persons is
not an incoherent notion. One writer has suggested that "by saying
that future generations have rights against existing generations we
can simply mean that there are enforceable requirements upon ex-
isting generations that would benefit or prevent harm to future gen-
erations."1 55 There seems at least enough sense in such a locution
to drive the operation of the equal protection clause as the relevant
source of legally enforceable requirements. Certainly, as we shall
see below, the law at least occasionally makes provision for the re-
151. But cf. Pletcher, The Rights of Future Generations, in RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 3,
at 169 (obligation to leave one's campsite clean for future campers as independent of
actual future use of that site).
152. See Ball, supra note 133, at 334 (future generations as unlikely to regard with
indifference a range of phenomena now regarded as grievous ills).
153. SeeJ. STERBA, THE DEMANDS OFJUSTICE 137 (1980).
154. See Macklin, supra note 133, at 154.
155. J. STERBA, supra note 153, at 138.
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covery in tort of persons not conceived at the time of the alleged
injurious act.156
If it is still insisted that equal protection depends crucially on
rights-talk, rather than obligations or responsibilities, and that
rights-talk is in our context logically peculiar, one final reply is pos-
sible. If there is indeed a conflict between the way we ordinarily
conceive of rights and the recognition of meaningful rights in future
persons, this shows only that one or the other way of thinking must
be adjusted. Perhaps it is the concept of rights that should be tai-
lored to fit our increasing capacity and inclination to work in-
tergenerational injury. Perhaps we should not retain unmodified
our prior metaethical understanding of rights at the substantive ex-
pense of future persons. Stretching the concept of rights, or apply-
ing it in unorthodox contexts, may well be justifiable in particular
kinds of cases.' 57 On the issue of obligations of present to future
generations, we are inevitably judges in our own case. If we find
such obligations, it is we who are bound; if we do not, we are off the
hook. Given our current proclivity for self-indulgence, we should
resolve any close intellectual questions in favor of the interests of
the future.
B. The Problem of Future Generation Identity
Doubts as to obligations to future generations should not, how-
ever, be dismissed without at least brief reference to a distinctive
and intriguing problem posed most elaborately by the philosopher
Derek Parfit. Parfit' 58 and others' 59 have argued, essentially, that
the very identities of those people who will come to make up future
generations is, in the present, highly contingent, and dependent
upon, among other things, our broad societal economic, environ-
mental, and other policies. A societal policy of gross generational
self-indulgence may, on Parfit's assumptions, itself be responsible
for different future people coming into being than those who would
have been born had a more generationally responsible policy been
adopted. Thus it is, on Parfit's view, open for the earlier generation
to reply to the complaints of the later generation in the following
way: Had we, the earlier generation, behaved as you suggest we
156. See infra note 182 & accompanying text.
157. See Rose, Environmental Faust Succumbs to Temptations of Economic Mephistopheles, or,
Value by Any Other Name is Preference (Book Review), 87 MICH. L. REV. 1631, 1645 (1989)
(citing Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE LJ. 1860 (1987)).
158. See D. PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 351-79 (1984); Parfit, Future Generations:
Further Problems, 11 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 113 (1982).
159. See, e.g., Schwartz, Obligations to Posterity, in OBLIGATIONS, supra note 2, at 4.
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should, you would not now, individually, have been born. You, with
your own established identity, would not have been around to com-
plain. Ask yourselves whether your imagined injuries at our hands
are such that it would have been better for you never to have been
born. If not, you are not worse off than you would have been had
we, the previous generation, behaved as you now assert we should.
You have therefore suffered no cognizable injury.
For the sake of discussion, we may accept the assumptions as to
personal identity and' reproductive biology required by Parfit's
widely-discussed' 6° argument. Assuming that Parfit's argument"works," it is not without significant implications. Professor Robert
Nozick, for example, has interpreted the "Lockean Proviso," or the
minimal obligation of early generations with respect to providing
for the resources and opportunities to be available for later genera-
tions, in terms of ensuring that members of later generations are
not made worse off than they would have been had the earlier gen-
eration not appropriated resources as they did. 61 On Parfit's as-
sumptions, however, a change in general property law changes who
will exist in the future. To avoid Parfit's identity problem, Nozick's
argument would have to be consistently stated not in terms of future
persons being at least as well off as they themselves would have
been in a state of nature, but in terms of the rights of all individuals
to have access to enough and as good resources as was available to
their predecessors. ' 62
As the example of Nozick's theory shows, however, it will often be
possible to avoid the force of Parfit's argument by recasting or even
by merely carefully stating the moral assertion in question. Parfit's
argument does not affect comparisons between the welfare of, for
example, persons actually born and those who would have been
born had earlier generations adopted more responsible economic
and environmental policies.' 63 Thus it is still possible for any mem-
ber of a future generation to object that she is in a worse position
than some corresponding person who would in some sense have
taken her place had earlier generations shown less self-indulgence.
Any member of a future generation will also be able to claim that
she has been treated unjustly by a prior generation by comparison
160. See, e.g., Baier, supra note 58, at 222; Bayles, Harm to the Unconceived, 5 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 292, 297-98 (1976); Kavka, The Paradox of Future Individuals, 11 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 93 (1982); Warren, supra note 150, at 153.
161. See R. NoZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 175 (1974). For a discussion of this
aspect of Nozick's theory, see Elliot, Future Generations, Locke's Proviso and Libertarian
Justice, 3J. APPLIED PHIL. 217 (1986).
162. See R. NoZICK, supra note 161, at 175.
163. See Baier, supra note 58, at 233.
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with how that prior generation treated members of their own
generation.
It therefore seems quite possible for a future generation's equal
protection challenge to bypass Parfit's identity problem. This need
not involve thinking of a future generation as having a fixed identity
of its own, apart from the individuals making it up. Members of
future generations may assert that a prior generation's policy
choices denied them the equal protection of the laws relative to
those persons who would have taken roughly their places had more
enlightened policies been adopted. Less counterfactually, members
of future generations may also assert a denial of equal protection
with respect precisely to the members of the prior generation who
benefited themselves by adopting the challenged policies. Members
of the later generation may be said to have been afforded less of
some crucial resource than their predecessor generation allocated
to itself. It of course remains true that if those policies had not been
adopted, the challenging parties themselves would, on Parfit's as-
sumptions, never have existed in the first place, so they are presum-
ably not "worse off" because of the adoption of the policies in
question. The equal protection challenge, however, may focus on
the availability of fewer resources, or the presence of greater obsta-
cles, for the actual members of later, as opposed to earlier, genera-
tions, where such disparities are traceable to the policy choices of
the earlier generation.
C. Equal Protection as a Relatively Stringent Moral Standard
Classically, liberal political theory has explicitly provided only
quite limited safeguards for the interests of future generations. t 64
In some respects, this is not surprising or disturbing, in that Hob-
bes, Locke, Hume, and Rousseau were not confronted with the pos-
sibility of radioactive waste remaining toxic for thousands of
years.' 65 The opportunity, if not the temptation, to despoil the fu-
ture has always been available, however.' 66 It is even less justifiable
for contemporary theorists who recognize moral rights held by or
for the benefit of future generations to adopt enforceable moral
standards less stringent than the interpretation of equal protection
flowing from what we have referred to as the progressive Burkean
partnership. 67
164. See Barry, supra note 17, at 283.
165. Cf Warren, supra note 150, at 141 (discussing such contemporary environmental
issues).
166. SeeJ. BUCHANAN, supra note 48, at 189.
167. See supra section II.
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Often, it will be unclear from a particular statement whether a
writer is endorsing an overall principle of intergenerational obliga-
tion weaker than the progressive Burkean interpretation of equal
protection, or is instead merely referring to one relatively unde-
manding element or minimal implication of a stronger principle.
Not all moral declarations take the form of a general theory. State-
ments endorsing a principle, for example, of providing for the basic
needs' of future generations may be ambiguous as to whether our
making such a provision would entirely discharge our moral obliga-
tion in this regard to future generations. A similar ambiguity may
attach to statements to the effect that we are obligated to leave fu-
ture generations at least as well off' 69 in some respect as we are, or
that we should avoid imposing or failing to reasonably prevent fu-
ture disasters and threats to the interests of future generations. 70
The crucial point, for our purposes, is that such formulations by
themselves, as well as more explicitly minimalist theories of in-
tergenerational justice such as that of Robert Nozick' 71 tend, under
typical historical circumstances, to fail to promote the interests of
future generations as well as the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection to future generations afforded by the progressive, suc-
cessively sacrificial interpretation of the Burkean partnership dis-
cussed above.172
Even reasonably stringent equal protection, however, does not
imply the moral arbitrariness of all societal policies burdening the
future. Given appropriate assumptions, it may be rational and fair
to shift certain costs or risks into the future. If we are faced with an
inescapable choice, for example, between the use of a toxic waste
disposal container that will rupture in fifty years, and an equally
costly container that will rupture in five hundred years, our ordinary
assumptions lead us systematically toward the latter choice. There
may be more people around to be affected in five hundred years.
But the probability of there being no one around to be adversely
affected in five hundred years is presumably at least slightly greater
than for fifty years hence. ' 73 Similarly, there is presumably at least a
slightly greater chance that people five hundred years from now, as
opposed to fifty, will not view a toxic waste container rupture as a
168. See, e.g., J. STERBA, supra note 153, at 139; Derr, supra note 3, at 43.
169. See, e.g., Barry, supra note 17, at 284; Kavka, supra note 16, at 202; Warren supra
note 150, at 139-40.
170. See, e.g., J. GLOVER, supra note 47, at 150; Baier, supra note 58, at 241.
171. See generally R. Nozick, supra note 161; Elliot, supra note 161.
172. See supra section I.
173. See Govier, What Should We Do About Future People?, 16 AM. PHIL. Q. 105, 109
(1979) (harm to future people measured by attitude toward harm to existing people).
[Vol. 59
POSTERITY AND THE CONSTITUTION
significant threat to their well-being, for various possible reasons.1 74
Medical science may well advance in relevant respects in the period
between fifty and five hundred years from now.' 75
These uncertainties illustrate that the most sensible approach to
the equal protection should, extreme cases aside, focus not on the
availability in the future of particular resources, or the absence of
particular risks, but on the overall level of resources and risks, and
the sufficiency of the resources that will be available to cope with the
risks. It will not matter crucially, within limits, if we deplete some
particular resource, if we also develop a fully adequate substitute, 176
or even that we impose the risk of a new disease, if we also bequeath
an inexpensive vaccine. Generally, equal protection of the future
should focus at a minimum on assuring adequate and increased
levels of overall wealth or resources to overcome or mitigate such
threats as may arise. It is for this reason that low savings rates and
imposed burdens of indebtedness are central to the problem of the
equal protection of future generations, and why litigation on behalf
of the future should focus centrally on federal fiscal policy. Suffi-
cient overall wealth in the future may fund the solutions to particu-
lar risks of various sorts.
Focusing on overall wealth, however, should not lead us morally
astray. In our society, aggregate or per capita wealth has generally
tended to increase over time. This contingent fact may have led
some writers to adopt a broader, noncontingent principle known as
the social discount rate. Advocates of such a principle have not en-
tirely agreed among themselves as to how the principle itself should
be expressed. 177 The general idea seems to be roughly that it is
rational and fair to gradually reduce the moral importance we attach
to events as those- events occur further in the future. On its own
terms, such a view is morally controversial at best. 178 For our pur-
poses, it is important to bear in mind that the reasonableness of
applying a social discount rate to future events depends entirely on
the validity of the crucial assumptions underlying the use of such a
174. SeeJ. GLOVER, supra note 47, at 149; Baier, supra note 58, at 227; Golding, supra
note 6, at 97-98; Passmore, supra note 13, at 51. We may set aside the option of using
most of the next five hundred years slowly to brainwash people into being delighted by
the possibility of being exposed to toxic waste. See Glover, How Should We Decide What
Sort of World Is Best?, in ETmICS AND PROBLEMS OF THE 21ST CENTURY 79, 87 (1979). We
may also set aside as an unnecessary complication the idea of establishing now a
compounding fund to provide compensation for remote victims of our actions.
175. For a sense of the limitations of this argument, see Barry, supra note 17, at 275.
176. See D. PARFIT, supra note 158, at 365.
177. See Baier, supra note 58, at 238.
178. See Williams, Discounting Versus Maximum Sustainable Yield, in OBLIGATIONS, supra
note 2, at 169.
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rate. If we assume that future generations will, because of return on
investment and invention, in fact be richer than our generation, or
more able to cope with a particular problem, or that the problem
may dissolve in the interim, these assumptions may lead occasion-
ally to fairly imposing some risks or costs on the future rather than
the present. But there is no independently grounded reason for
concluding that a particular degree of human pain in the year 2020
in and of itself matters somewhat less than the same degree of pain
today.' 79
Even when the social discount rate literature is interpreted to take
future pain as seriously as present pain, the sense of equality per-
vading much of that literature remains static and unhistorical. As a
matter of American cultural tradition, we have not been content
with providing a mix of resources and risks such that each suc-
ceeding generation is merely just as well off as its predecessor.
While this tradition is perhaps now attenuated, we have traditionally
held, partly from a sense of moral responsibility, that each genera-
tion should start from a higher baseline level of well-being and re-
sources than its predecessors, whether this required substantial
sacrifices by the prior generation or not. In either its positive or
normative moments, the social discount rate literature shows little
recognition of the historic importance of this cultural tradition of
successive generational sacrifice.' 0
There is a final respect in which equal protection of future genera-
tions can be seen as a relatively stringent moral standard. This is
simply that there is no reason to believe that anything like the pro-
gressive Burkean partnership is hardwired into our very natures.
179. See D. PARFrr, supra note 158, at 480-86; Nielsen, The Enforcement of Morality and
Future Generations, 3 PHILOSOPHIA 443, 445-46 (1973). For general discussion of the idea
of a social discount rate, and of the optimal such rate, see G. BRENNAN &J. BUCHANAN,
supra note 48, at 83-84 (noting the problem of actually implementing a theoretically
optimal social discount rate); Baumol, On the Social Rate of Discount, 58 AM. ECON. REv.
788, 801 (1968) (concluding that apart from certain externalities and public goods
problems, "the future can be left to take care of itself"); Marglin, The Social Rate of
Discount and the Optimal Rate of Investment, 77 O.J. ECON. 95, 98 (1963) (discussing a
"democratic" rationale for not overruling a fully informed citizenry's possible
indifference to the welfare of future generations); Mishan, Economic Criteria for
Intergenerational Comparisons, 9 FUTURES 383, 397 (1977) (equal distribution of natural
resources and capital endowment among all generations as a just distribution); Mueller,
IntergenerationalJustice and the Social Discount Rate, 5 THEORY & DECISION 263, 267 (1974)
(same); Sen, On Optimising the Rate of Saving, 71 ECON. J. 479, 495 (1961) (noting
possibility of rational discrepancy between individual and collective preferences for
optimal savings rates); Tullock, The Social Rate of Discount and the Optimal Rate of Investment:
Comment, 78 Q.J. ECON. 331, 334 (1964) (increasing consumption of persons "already"
consuming more than ourselves has little attraction).
180. See the discussions referred to parenthetically supra note 179.
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There is no reason to assume that patterns of social, environmental,
and economic redistribution victimizing future generations are pro-
hibited by our genetic programming.
The young and controversial science of sociobiology' 8 empha-
sizes the role of assistance by older to younger relatives 82 and
broader patterns of reciprocal altruism' 85 in the process of each set
of genes' "striving" to reproduce itself over time. 184 Even if we as-
sume the descriptive usefulness of the less extreme claims of soci-
obiological theory, however, that theory gives us no grounds for
complacency. We can grievously shortchange future generations
through collective public policy without disadvantaging particular
genes or substantially impairing the likelihood of any set of genes'
proliferating in the next generation or so.
Even where intergenerational redistribution would make the sur-
vival of particular genes somewhat less likely, biology imposes no
insuperable barrier to this sort of redistribution. Even the most ar-
dent sociobiologists recognize the existence of forms of altruism
and of "personal," as opposed to genetic, selfishness not explaina-
ble through sociobiological theory. 185 Human behavior, even to-
ward our individual and collective descendants, is plainly influenced
by culture, 8 6 as contemporary divorce law, environmental law, and
federal budgetary policy make clear.'8 7 As Professor John Beck-
strom has duly recognized, "[n]o one doubts that we can neglect
our relatives and bestow benefits on strangers if we concentrate on
doing so." 188
Thus, even if we assume the least implausible claims of sociobio-
logical theory to be true and useful, we still have no grounds for
concluding that substantial intergenerational redistribution at the
expense of posterity must be only a short-lived phenomenon, or
that such a pattern of redistribution, however temporary, cannot
181. For a relatively thorough, technical treatment of sociobiology, see E. WILSON,
SOCIOBIOLOGY: THE NEW SYNrHESIS (1975).
182. See R. DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 103 (1976).
183. See id. at 197-202; Trivers, The Evolution of ReciprocalAltruism, 46 Q. REV. BIOLOGY
35 (1971).
184. See R. DAWKINS, supra note 182, at IX; Beckstrom, Behavioral Research on Aid-Giving
That Can Assist Lawmakers While Testing Scientific Theory, 1 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y
25, 28 (1985) ("most of our behavior is, consciously or unconsciously, to a greater or
lesser degree directed towards reproducing our genes").
185. See Beckstrom, The Potential Dangers and Benefits of Introducing Sociobiology to Lawyers,
79 Nw. U.L. REV. 1279, 1280 (1985).
186. See Maleski, Sociobiology and the California Public Trust Doctrine: The New Synthesis
Applied, 25 NAT. RESOURCES J. 429, 439 (1985).
187. See supra text at section III.
188. Beckstrom, supra note 185, at 1280.
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rise to a level of constitutional significance, deserving of judicial
attention.
V. CONCLUSION: EQUAL PROTECTION OF FUTURE GENERATIONS AS
A LEGALLY RESOLVABLE ISSUE
As a matter of disembodied logic, it is possible to agree with each
proposition enunciated above, and yet conclude that no judicial re-
dress based on the equal protection clause should ever be available,
because of inherent, unavoidable problems associated with matters
such as standing, ripeness, and the political question doctrine. It is
also possible to reply that the underlying intergenerational problem
is not of the nature or severity indicated, or that ordinary electoral
mechanisms can somehow be expected to provide redress. How-
ever, the severity and intractability of the problem justifies any rea-
sonable modifications of the ordinary rules of justiciability,
developed for use in other contexts, necessary to redress a massive
breach in our historical social contract. If one sees the problem as
one of great practical importance and as otherwise not likely to be
resolved, one will ask whether observance of familiar strict rules of
justiciability is worth the immense price required. One will be
tempted to view a mechanical insistence on restrictive doctrines of
justiciability, at the price of massive injustice to the politically unen-
franchised, as a mere rationalization reflecting the same self-indul-
gence as led to the underlying problem of intergenerational
injustice in the first place. The choice, however, between practical
redress and jurisprudential purity is really not so stark. There is a
plausible case for the justiciability of equal protection claims on be-
half of future generations based on existing doctrines and trends in
the case law.
The inability of future generations to themselves literally appear
and seek injunctive or declaratory relief at the most propitious time
is more, rather than less, reason to take their interests seriously
through recognizing legal guardians to make obvious legal claims
on their behalf. 18 9 The courts have occasionally been willing to rec-
ognize legally enforceable duties owed not merely to those not yet
born, but to those not yet even conceived, 90 at least as long as the
189. See Sartorius, supra note 150, at 201.
190. See, e.g., Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 233-34, 643 P.2d 954, 962, 182 Cal.
Rptr. 337, 345 (1982) (en banc) (negligent failure to diagnose hereditary problem pre-
conception as giving rise to legal cause of action in later-conceived child); Harbeson v.
ParkerDavis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 480, 656 P.2d 483, 495 (1983) (en banc) (holding
that "a duty may extend to persons not yet conceived at the time of a negligent act or
omission" as limited by foreseeability); see also Bayles, supra note 160, at 294-95; Tucker,
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injury is, as in our context, reasonably foreseeable. Standing to seek
at least injunctive relief should similarly be recognized in our
context.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "standing
is not to be denied simply because many people suffer the same in-
jury .... ,,19 While the Court has also declined to recognize stand-
ing where the challenged harm "amounts only to a generalized
grievance shared by a large number of citizens in a substantially
equal measure,"' 92 this is, even if applicable in our contexts, merely
a prudential, rather than a constitutionally required, restriction on
standing. 93 More fundamentally, substantial wealth redistribution
from future to present voters is not simply a random outcome of the
political process, but a predictable result of the non-enfranchise-
ment of a group in some cases largely coextensive with the victims
of such redistribution.
It is also possible to deny that a case involving the equal protec-
tion of future generations can ever, by its very nature, be judicially"ripe" for resolution. The United States Supreme Court, however,
has found sufficient ripeness, admittedly in light of certain immedi-
ately threatened effects,' 94 in a case in which waiting for possible
future consequences, in the form of an actual nuclear accident,
would have added immeasurably to the concreteness and certainty
associated with the crucial substantive issue in the case, the limita-
tion of utility company damages liability.' 95 Quite sensibly, the
Court in ripeness contexts considers not only the fitness or suitabil-
ity of the issues for resolution by the court,196 but the degree of
hardship to the parties, including the plaintiff, of delaying or with-
holding judicial resolution. 97 In our context, delaying court chal-
lenge until the future generation arrives to feel the injury does not
Wrongful Life: A New Generation, 27J. Fm, . L. 673, 687 (1989) (briefly discussing relevant
case law). But cf Wincamp Partnership v. Anne Arundel County, 458 F. Supp. 1009,
1025 (D. Md. 1978) (plaintiff land developers lack standing to raise right to travel of
third parties either of present or of future generations).
191. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP),
412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973).
192. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env'tal. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 80 (1978).
See C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS ch. 2, § 13, at 71 (4th ed. 1983).
193. See Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 80.
194. See id. at 73.
195. See id. at 81-82.
196. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967).
197. See Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 82 (consideration of adverse effects on parties of
deferring judicial resolution); Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 164 (1967)
(noting the relevance, in dicta, of irremediable adverse consequences); Abbott
Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 149 (consideration of "hardship to the parties of withholding
court consideration").
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simply avoid abstract or premature litigation, but inescapably dic-
tates that no legal remedy whatsoever may ever be had. Considera-
tions essentially similar to those involved in the issues of standing
and ripeness arise in the political question doctrine.' 98
In general, the question of the justiciability of equal protection
challenges to the "time bomb" effects of matters such as federal
budgetary policy presents yet another forum for the perpetual
struggle between formalism and realism in constitutional adjudica-
tion. 19 9 In this context, however, the eventual triumph ofjurispru-
dential realism must come at the cost of some sacrifice by current
generations.
198. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (granting the plaintiffs standing to
sue for relief under equal protection clause). Most of the considerations normally
suggesting nonjusticiability on political question grounds are essentially inapplicable in
our context. See id. It is of course possible to argue that there is a "lack ofjudicially
discoverable and manageable standards" for resolving the equal protection claims of
future generations based on, for example, current federal budgetary policy. Id. This
argument, though, again amounts to a litmus test for one's degree of sympathy for the
plaintiff's claims on the merits. There are a number of variant approaches to the
problem of equal protection in our context, but we can lend precision and predictability
to the judicial resolution of these cases simply by settling on some particular approach.
Admittedly, a great degree of speculation and imprecision in fashioning any injunctive
or declaratory relief will be inevitable. As we have come to appreciate in ordinary tort
and contract contexts, though, where the effects of the injury may be manifold and long-
term, a remedy that embodies our best guesses about future events may well be fairer
than denying any remedy at all, which preposterously assumes that probable future
effects are best thought of as non-existent. See, e.g., Pipkin v. Thomas & Hill, Inc.; 298
N.C. 278, 288-89, 258 S.E.2d 778, 785 (1979).
It should be remembered, finally, that we are applying the equal protection clause, a
constitutional provision with an immense body of explanatory case law in a wide variety
of broad social contexts, where a given case frequently affects millions of citizens. In
this regard, our approach is less speculative and less path-breaking than, for example,
the popular call for a new Constitutional amendment purporting to require a balanced
federal budget. For discussion of some of the justiciability issues involved in that
context, see Stith, Federal Spending and the Deficit, 11 GEO. MASON U.L. REV. 119 (1988);
Stubblebine, Fiscal Balance and the Federal Constitution, 11 GEO. MASON U.L. REV. 125
(1988); Thornburgh, Gramm-Rudman-Hollings and the Balanced Budget Amendment: A Page of
Histoty, 25 HARV. J. LEGIs. 611 (1988); Note, Article III Problems in Enforcing the Balanced
Budget Amendment, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1065 (1983).
199. Compare, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (allowing otherwise
insoluble broad social problems to remain unredressed out of excessive doctrinal
fastidiousness) with NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (finally
breaking with such fastidiousness).
